Introduction
This essay is about how the notion of "structure" in ontic structuralism might be made precise. More specifically, my aim is to make precise the idea that the structure of the world is (somehow) given by the relations inhering in the world, in such a way that the relations are ontologically prior to their relata. The central claim is the following: one can do so by giving due attention to the relationships that hold between those relations, by making use of certain notions from algebraic logic. In the remainder of this introduction, I sketch two motivations for structuralism, and make some preliminary remarks about the relationship between structuralism and ontological dependence; in the next section, I outline my preferred way of unpacking the notion of "structure"; in §3, I compare this view to Dasgupta's algebraic generalism; and finally, I evaluate the view by considering how well it can be defended against objections.
Motivations for structuralism
I don't intend to spend a lot of time discussing the motivations for structuralism: this essay is more about what the best way might be to understand structuralism, rather than about whether or not structuralism is a compelling position. Nevertheless, whether a given proposal is the best way to understand structuralism will clearly depend on the extent to which that proposal recovers motivations for structuralism and renders them compelling. So in this section, I outline two motivations for structuralism (and give thumbnail sketches of arguments for them). 1 There are other motivations, of course, such as metaphysical underdetermination (Ladyman (1998) , French (2006) , French (2011) ), or certain features of particle physics (Roberts (2011 ), McKenzie (2014b , McKenzie (2014a) ). I only outline two here, because they are the two which connect most directly with what I want to say; for a comprehensive overview of structuralism and the motivations for it, see Frigg First, consider the argument from the history of science. The argument here is that although there is, as the pessimistic meta-induction notes, significant change in the content of our best scientific theories over time, this change does not (or does not so strongly) alter the structural features of those theories. Thus (to take a well-worn example), the idea is that in the transition from Fresnel's theory of light to Maxwell's, although there is indeed radical change in the ontological commitments of our theories (since the ontological commitment to the ether is dropped between the one theory and the next), there is nevertheless a structural continuity-as evidenced by the fact that Fresnel's equations governing light propagation were retained in the new theory.
This is then taken to show that if scientific realists are to resist the pessimistic metainduction, they ought to confine their belief in theories to just the structural aspects of those theories, since it is those aspects which are most likely to survive into future theoretical incarnations. Moreover, this observation is taken to show, or suggest, that it is the structural aspects of a theory to which a theory's empirical success ought properly to be attributed: as Worrall puts it, Roughly speaking, it seems right to say that Fresnel completely misidentified the nature of light; but, none the less, it is no miracle that his theory enjoyed the empirical predictive success it did; it is no miracle because Fresnel's theory, as science later saw, attributed to light the right structure.
Second, consider the argument from redundancy. Here, the concern is that an objectladen ontology exhibits a certain kind of redundancy, analogous to the redundancy of Newtonian spacetime with respect to Newtonian dynamics. For, consider any initial state of some system described in terms of particular individuals, and compare it with an initial state obtained by a mere permutation of those individuals (so that the distribution of qualitative properties and relations remains the same, with the only change being which individuals bear which properties and relations). The relevant observation is then that such a permutation commutes with the dynamics: the final states obtained by letting the original and permuted states evolve (under any dynamics with which we are familiar) will be related by exactly that same permutation. Therefore the permutation is, in a certain sense, "decoupled" from the dynamical evolution: differences at one time over which individuals have which properties and relations do not lead to any other differences at any other times. This provides a sense in which the facts about individuals and Votsis (2011). 2 Worrall (1989) 3 (Worrall, 1989, p. 157) 4 Dasgupta (2009) , Dasgupta (2011) do not seem to play any physically significant role, and hence seem to be redundant to our physical theorising. Moreover, insofar as we take ourselves and our processes of knowing to be physical processes, this observation seems to imply that those facts are not empirically accessible. For what it shows is that if two situations differ merely with respect to these facts (i.e., are related by a permutation of some kind), then there can be no physical process which converts that difference into any other kind of difference: a difference, for example, regarding whether I say "wow, the individuals here aren't the ones I dealt with previously!", or regarding my written response to any question about which individuals are here before me. But plausibly, a necessary condition on a certain kind of fact being empirically accessible to me is that it should (in principle) be possible to set up a reliable correlation between facts of that kind and facts about what I say, inscribe, etc. So what we see is that the physical redundancy of individuals negates the possibility of setting up such a correlation, even in principle-and hence, that the facts about individuals will not be empirically accessible.
One might be concerned that this argument does not, by itself, deliver a case for saying anything revolutionary about the ontological status of individuals. All it seems to require is denying the possibility of merely haecceitistic differences (differences only over which individuals play which qualitative roles); so why not simply be an antihaecceitist about objects, rather than anything more radical? I'm sympathetic to this concern, but for the purposes of this essay I will bracket my sympathy and speak on behalf of the structuralist who is moved by the argument from redundancy. What such a structuralist should say, I think, is that it is not enough to just assert that objects lack individual haecceities; some account ought to be given of what objects are like, in a manner which illuminates or makes transparent just why they lack those haecceities.
The relevant analogy is that of something like electromagnetic potentials. It's one thing to assert that two potentials related by a gauge transformation are physically equivalent, i.e., to deny the possibility of merely gauge differences; it is quite another to provide an account of the invariant structure underlying those gauge-related potentials, in such a way as to make transparent just why gauge transformations do not change anything physical. In this case, electromagnetic fields provide such an account. Thus, the issue is whether the structuralist can find some account of what the world is like, which will stand to the usual account of objects as the account of electromagnetic fields stands to 5 This is an instance of the general argument discussed by Roberts (2008) . 6 Here, I'm employing Melia (1999) 's definition of haecceitism as "the view that there are distinct possibilities that differ only over which objects play which roles." 7 cf. Pooley (2006) , Greaves (2011 ). 8 cf. McSweeney (2016 ; (Sider, 2017, chapter 5) . the account of electromagnetic potentials (and which will undergird anti-haecceitism, in the same way that fields undergird gauge-equivalence).
Dependence, elimination, and determination
Ontic structuralists claim that they can provide such an account, by holding that objects are ontologically dependent on structures. To unpack this thought, let's distinguish some attitudes one might have towards the relative ontological dependence of structure and objects. (At this stage, I'll leave undefined what is meant by "structure", "object", or "ontological priority": the aim is just to enumerate some slogans, the exact content of which is yet to be determined.) One could think that structure is ontologically dependent on objects, but not vice versa; one could think that objects are ontologically dependent on structure, but not vice versa; one could think that neither objects nor structures are ontologically dependent on the other; or one could think that both objects and structure are ontologically dependent on one another. Generally speaking, ontic structuralism is identified with either the second or fourth positions: that is, ontic structuralism is characterised by a belief that objects are ontologically dependent on structures. The fourth view, according to which structures are reciprocally dependent on objects, I'll refer to as moderate ontic structuralism; the second view, according to which structures are not ontologically dependent on objects, I'll refer to as radical ontic structuralism.
Within radical ontic structuralism, there is a further subdivision. According to the eliminativist, objects do not-strictly speaking-exist at all. Rather, the structure is all there is; speaking of objects is a mere façon de parler for describing what the structure is up to. According to the non-eliminativist, objects do indeed exist-it's just that whenever they exist, they're ontologically dependent on structures.The structuralism articulated in this essay is a form of radical ontic structuralism. It can, I think, be adapted into either an eliminative or non-eliminative version; I now say a few words about what might constrain adapting it one way or the other.
The relevant constraint is the extent to which the structural facts determine the objectual facts. That is, what kinds of objectual facts are fully fixed by the structural facts, and
which are left open? It seems implausible that any structuralist view will enable the recovery of haecceitistic structural facts, facts about which objects are which-indeed, given that the avoidance of haecceitism is a motivation for structuralism, it would be a problem if this were so. Formally, we can model this by supposing that on any structuralist position, the structural facts should be expected to determine the objectual 9 Esfeld and Lam (2010) 10 French and Ladyman (2003) , French and Ladyman (2010) facts only up to qualitative isomorphism: i.e., that given two objectual representations (Tarski-models) M and N which are qualitatively isomorphic (so that there is a bĳection f : |M| → |N | such that for any qualitative predicate P , f (P M ) = P N ), M and N will correspond to the same structural representation. The idea behind this formulation is to leave open how to best model haecceitism: whether as holding that isomorphic models may represent distinct possibilities, or as holding that one ought to include non-qualitative predicates (e.g. predicates representing haecceities) in one's models.
However, this only commits us to thinking that qualitative isomorphism should be a sufficient condition for sameness of structural representation, not that it should be a necessary condition. So the further question remains: does a full specification of the structural facts determine the objectual facts up to qualitative isomorphism, or might a given configuration of structural facts be consistent with two objectual representations which are not qualitatively isomorphic to one another? I will make the following assumption: the radical non-eliminativist must assume that the structural facts suffice to fully fix the objectual facts (up to qualitative isomorphism); the radical eliminativist, however, may allow that two qualitatively non-isomorphic configurations of objects are consistent with the same structural facts.
The idea behind this assumption is that the latter, but not the former, can to at least some extent be an anti-realist about the objectual facts: they can think, for example, that there may just be no (genuine) fact of the matter about how many objects there are, or about precisely what those objects are up to. After all, if object-talk is just a way of characterising structure-configurations, then it may well turn out that two different descriptions in the "objectual mode" can characterise the same structure-configuration.
In such a case, the eliminativist structuralist can shrug their shoulders, and just regard these descriptions as equivalent. That's not a problem, for although the two descriptions disagree about what exactly objects are up to, they agree on the structural facts; and only the latter are (genuine) facts. Such an attitude is analogous to (say) the attitude of most physicists towards electromagnetic potentials, or of ordinal utility theorists towards utilities. Two potential-distributions related by a gauge transformation, or two utility-functions related by an increasing monotonic transformation, are regarded as equivalent. That's not a problem, for although those descriptions disagree over what exactly the potentials or the utilities are up to, they agree on the facts regarding fields or preferences-and only the latter constitute (genuine) facts.
The non-eliminativist structuralist, by contrast, does not have this same freedom. For, 11 cf. Kaplan (1975) 12 I read Weatherall (2016) as advocating that haecceitism should be modelled in this latter fashion.
I take it, what it is to be committed to the existence of objects is to be committed to regarding (at least) the qualitative facts about objects as genuine, bona fide facts. So on the one hand, they have to get those facts from somewhere; and on the other, if they are really serious that all the fundamental facts are structural facts, then it seems the only place from which they could get them is from facts about the structure. That's a problem if it turns out that the same structure-configuration is compatible with multiple objectconfigurations: for then, it's not clear in what sense the objectual facts are being derived from the structural facts. In other words, the following principle seems plausible: if the x-facts fully depend upon the y-facts, then the y-facts should fix or determine the x-facts.
(For instance, it seems like a necessary condition on taking the thermodynamical facts to depend upon the statistical-mechanical facts is that the statistical-mechanical facts fix the thermodynamical facts.) The moderate structuralist denies that the object-facts do fully depend upon the structural facts; the eliminative structuralist denies that the qualitative distribution of objects really ought to be (always) regarded as facts at all; but the radical, non-eliminative structuralist can do neither.
Structure as the web of relations

No relations without relata?
Thus, our challenge is to characterise what the "structural facts" are, which the "objectual facts" could be thought of as (perhaps superfluously) representing. The good news is that there is a fairly well-known answer to this which radical ontic structuralists have offered: that the structure of the world consists in the web or family of relations instantiated in the world. Thus, for example, French and Ladyman (2010) write that On either form of [radical ontic structuralism], we are basically saying the following: although the set-theoretic representation of structure, A, R (where A is a set of elements and R a family of relations) must be written down from left to right, from an ontological perspective it should be read semitically, that is, from right to left.
Later, the identification is made even more explicit when they remark (in passing) that "as far as the structuralist is concerned, there is nothing but the structure-that is, the set of relations" (French and Ladyman, 2010, p. 37) . Other commentators have also suggested this as a reading of radical ontic structuralism: for example, Wolff (2012) 13 (French and Ladyman, 2010, p. 33) characterises the view as holding that "structure was to be understood as something like a web of relations."
The bad news, however, is that when radical ontic structuralism is combined with this conception of structure, the view is regarded by many as incoherent: for, the slogan goes, one cannot have relations without relata. Thus consider, for instance, Chakravartty's attack:
Consider the idea that SR [structural realism] tells us nothing about entities that partake in relations. This is false in at least the banal sense that, as noted earlier, the existence of relations allows us to ascribe, if nothing else, existence to the entities so related, whatever they may be exactly and however we may describe them. A famous dictum of Quine's holds that 'to be is to be quantified over' in some first order language. [. . . ] This much must seem obvious-one cannot intelligibly subscribe to the reality of relations unless one is also committed to the fact that some things are related.
My preferred reading of this criticism is that it faces the structuralist with a dilemma.
Suppose that we do indeed seek to identify structure with a set of relations {R i }. The dilemma is this: are the elements of this set understood as primitive entities, or as being (say) sets of tuples? Somebody who uses the latter construal cannot, it seems, be a radical structuralist: for in their ontology, relations are not fundamental entities, but are instead derivative constructions. So, the radical structuralist must have in mind the first construal. But, goes the other horn of the dilemma, this just isn't any account of relations at all-if she is serious about taking relations as primitive, and about taking "structure" to be the set of relations, then all she is saying is that structure is constituted by a set of primitive "we-know-not-what"s; the only structural fact, on such a reading of "structure", would be facts about how many relations there are (since the only facts that a set of unstructured primitives supports are facts about its cardinality).
Boolean structuralism
I now propose a way out of this dilemma: specifically, a way in which the second horn can be neutralised, so that the eliminative structuralist can maintain both that relations are primitive entities in the ontology (i.e., are not structured entities that have been constructed out of objects), whilst having a suitably rich conception of structural facts.
The trick is to reject the claim that the structure be identified with a mere set of relations, and instead identify the structure with a structured set of relations: specifically, with an algebra of relations. In effect, the idea is that the structuralist's ontology should include both the relations (as primitive entities), and the relationships that those relations bear to one another. As I'll show below, this gets around the objection above; it also has the advantage that the appropriate kinds of algebraic structures have been introduced and studied extensively by mathematicians and logicians, and so we have "off-the-shelf" ways of making the view precise.
Let's begin with a simple case. Suppose that we wished to capture the "structure" of a model M of predicate logic, for a language containing only monadic predicates
etc. The relevant observation is that there are, in general, various important relationships between those extensions: for instance, perhaps (it turns out) the extension of F is disjoint from the extension of G; perhaps, even, the two extensions are the complement of one another. Or perhaps G lies entirely within H. Or perhaps the intersection of F and H strictly includes G. On the object-oriented viewpoint, such claims are understood in terms of the set-theoretic makeup of the extensions: that is, we interpret "intersection" as set-theoretic intersection, complement as set-theoretic complement, etc.
The proposal to hand, however, is to instead take them as self-standing claims in their own right, asserted to hold between the extensions construed as primitive entities (rather than as sets of objects). In order to do so, we had better say something about the interpretation of terms such as "intersection" or "complement". Here's the trick:
rather than interpreting them explicitly as certain kinds of set-theoretic constructions, we instead interpret them implicitly by providing an appropriate axiomatisation. In this case, an appropriate set of axioms is the axioms for Boolean algebras. Recall that a Boolean algebra consists of a set equipped with two binary operations · ("meet") and + ("join"), one unary operation − ("complement"), and two privileged elements 0 ("bottom") and 1 ("top"), obeying the following axioms: for any elements a, b, c of the algebra,
In what sense are these axioms appropriate? Recall that we are postulating these axioms in order to implicitly define the relationships amongst the extensions, as an alternative to defining those relationships explicitly in set-theoretic terms. So a minimal desideratum is that all of these axioms should be satisfied when those relationships are given their set-theoretic interpretations (i.e. interpreting meet as intersection, join as union, and complement as complement). It's not hard to verify that this is indeed the case, subject to one important proviso: in order to get a Boolean algebra out of our model M, it is not enough to consider the atomic extensions F M , G M , etc.; we need to also include the complex extensions (e.g. the set of objects in |M| satisfying (F x ∧ Gx)) in the algebra.
Thus, one aspect of the appropriateness of the Boolean-algebra axioms is that they are (in a certain sense) "sound" with respect to the set-theoretic interpretation: for any model M in a monadic language, the definable extensions over M (together with the set-theoretic operations of intersection, union and complement) constitute a Boolean algebra. We will denote this algebra as B(M).
However, there's another factor which makes the Boolean-algebra axioms appropriate.
Not only can any set of subsets be interpreted as a Boolean algebra; any Boolean algebra can be interpreted as a set of subsets of some domain. This result is known as Stone's theorem: stated more carefully, it is the result that for any Boolean algebra B, there is some set X such that B is isomorphic to a Boolean algebra constructed out of subsets of X. Thus, the axioms of Boolean algebras are, in a certain sense, "complete" with respect to the set-theoretic interpretation: any Boolean algebra B can be thought of as arising from, or as represented by, subsets of some domain of objects. That said, it will not always be the case that this representation will take the form of a model of (monadic) predicate logic, as can be seen by a simple cardinality argument: at least in a standard first-order language, there are only countably many formulae, and hence a model of such a language will contain only countably many definable extensions; thus, no such model can represent a Boolean algebra containing uncountably many elements. In a slogan, we could say that although the axioms (B1)-(B10) are complete with respect to the settheoretic interpretation of Boolean algebras, they are not complete with respect to the model-theoretic interpretation. But that seems like a reasonable form of completeness to demand; demanding completeness with respect to the model-theoretic interpretation would amount to fetishising finitary first-order logic.
If someone were to understand structure in this sense, they would have to deny that the structural facts suffice to fully determine the objectual facts. The reason for this is the following technical observation: in general, there are non-isomorphic models of monadic predicate logic with isomorphic Boolean algebras, as the following (trivial) example illustrates. Suppose that our signature has just one monadic predicate, K, and let M 1 and M 2 be models for that signature defined as follows: M 1 has one element in its domain, M 2 has two elements, and in both cases, K M i = |M i |. Then in both cases, the Boolean algebra of definable extensions is (or rather, is isomorphic to) the trivial two-element algebra 2-even though the two models are not isomorphic (since they disagree over the number of objects that exist). A less trivial illustration is as follows.
For any model M of any language of monadic predicate logic, consider the following equivalence relation ≈ over |M|: a ≈ b whenever there is an automorphism h of M such that b = h(a). Let M ≈ be the quotient of M by ≈, i.e., the model whose elements are ≈-equivalence classes of M, and where for any predicate P ,
(this is well-defined, since it is guaranteed that if a ≈ b, then a ∈ P M iff b ∈ P M ). Then M and M ≈ will give rise to the isomorphic Boolean algebras, and hence have the same Boolean structure. These examples show that for the "Boolean structuralist", fixing the structure of the world does not suffice to determine the objectual character of the world. As discussed above, that suggests that the radical Boolean structuralist would have to be an eliminativist structuralist; if structural equivalence really is to suffice for bona fide equivalence, then the Boolean structuralist will have to be an anti-realist about objects.
How much of an anti-realist do they have to be? That is, how much disagreement over objects must the Boolean structuralist be willing to brook? To answer this question, first recall the notion of a definitional expansion of a model M of (not necessarily monadic) predicate logic. If the vocabulary of M is Σ, then a definitional expansion of M is a model whose vocabulary is Σ + , where Σ ⊂ Σ + , such that:
We then say that two models M and N are definitionally equivalent if they have a common definitional expansion: that is, if there are definitional expansions M + and N + such that M + = N + . Second, recall that two models are said to be elementarily equivalent if they satisfy exactly the same sentences of their associated languages. We then have the following result:
Proposition 1. Suppose that M and N are two models of models of two monadic first-order languages (without identity). Then B(M) ∼ = B(N ) iff M is elementarily equivalent to some model definitionally equivalent to N (that is, iff there are definitional expansions M + and N + such that M + is elementarily equivalent to N + ).
Proof. See (Monk, 2000, Theorem 3. 3).
Cylindric structuralism
Of course, the limitation to monadic extensions is somewhat antithetical to the structuralist credo. But the algebraisation of a collection of subsets by Boolean algebra is only the simplest example of this kind of construction. The extension to binary relations yields the notion of a relation algebra: this encodes not only the Boolean operations, but also the operations of conversion and composition. The theory of relation algebras is sufficient to express any first-order formula containing no more than three variablesand hence, to express virtually all the mathematics one is liable to use-but if one did want to go further, then two natural options are the theory of polyadic algebras, or that of cylindric algebras . A polyadic algebra has, in addition to the standard Boolean operations, an operation corresponding to existential quantification; a cylindric algebra has the standard Boolean operations, an operation corresponding to existential quantification, and privileged elements corresponding to the identity. Thus, which kind 20 I stress that the language is without identity in order to stress that the elementary equivalence here is with respect to that language: i.e., that M + and N + will not (in general) satisfy the same identity-sentences. 21 Halmos (1954) , Halmos (1962) ; for interesting reflections on the development of polyadic algebras, see Halmos (2000) . 22 See Monk (2000) . 23 As this suggests, one can think of cylindric algebras as polyadic algebras enriched with an operation of identity: more precisely, one can show that the "locally finite" polyadic algebras with identity are equivalent to the "locally finite" cylindric algebras (see Galler (1957) or (Plotkin, 2000, §1. 2)).
of algebra is appropriate for capturing the structure will depend on the structuralist's attitude towards identity. For structuralists willing to admit identity as a bona fide autonomous relation, then cylindric algebras would seem to be the more appropriate choice; for those unwilling to do so, polyadic algebras recommend themselves. For the sake of concreteness and generality, I will discuss cylindric algebras (but extending my remarks to polyadic algebras should be straightforward).
So, let us start by describing the cylindric-algebraic structure of a model M of firstorder (polyadic) predicate logic. We will suppose that the variables of the associated first-order language come with some specific ordering, x 1 , x 2 , . . . . Now, consider any infinite sequence a = a 1 , a 2 , . . . , of elements of |M|, and any formula φ(ξ 1 , . . . , ξ n ) of the language of M. We will say that a satisfies φ in M just in case M satisfies φ relative to some (hence, any) variable-assignment sending each ξ i to a i . We will denote this as
Thus, we can form the set of all M-definable extensions, M = {φ M : φ is a formula of the language of M}. We will take this set as the domain of the algebra. Since each element of M is a subset of the set of all infinite sequences, we can equip M with Boolean structure in the same fashion as the monadic case; and since the language is closed under the propositional operations, M is closed under the Boolean operations. Then, as mentioned above, we also equip M with two further pieces of structure. First, for any i, j ∈ N, we define the
Second, for any i ∈ N, we define i-cylindrification to be the mapping
As in the Boolean case, the cylindric structuralist proposes that the elements of this algebra-the relations-not be given a set-theoretic interpretation (i.e., that they not be interpreted as sets of sequences) but rather taken as primitive, fundamental entities. As in the Boolean case, the legitimacy of this proposal depends on the possibility of replacing the explicit, set-theoretic interpretation of the algebraic structures by an implicit, axiomatic interpretation. Fortunately, we do indeed have such an interpretation. An (abstract) cylindric algebra consists of a set A, equipped with
• Boolean operations ·, +, −, and privileged elements 1, 0;
• For each i, j ∈ N, a privileged element d ij ;
• For every i ∈ N, a unary operation c i : A → A 24 cf. Leitgeb and Ladyman (2008) 25 Thus, the elements of the algebra are sets of infinite sequences, not-as one might have thought-sets of n-tuples. This just avoids certain technical wrinkles that we would have to deal with if working with sequences of different lengths: see the discussion in (Németi, 1991, §4) .
obeying the Boolean axioms (B1)-(B10), as well as the following axioms (for any r, s, t ∈ A, and any distinct i, j, k ∈ N):
In what sense are these axioms appropriate? Well, first, we have soundness (with respect to the set-theoretic interpretation) in the same sense as for Boolean algebras:
for any model M, the axioms (B1)-(B10) and (C1)-(C7) are satisfied if we take M as the underlying set, the set-theoretic operations as the Boolean operations, the diagonal sets D ij as the d ij and the cylindrification operations C i as the c i . We will denote this cylindric algebra as C(M). More generally, given any set U and ordinal α, we can construct cylindric algebras whose elements are sets of α-length sequences of elements of U (i.e., all functions α → U ). Such an algebra is referred to as a cylindric set algebra (of dimension α).
The issue of completeness is slightly more delicate. There is no straightforward analogue of the Stone theorem: in general, there are cylindric algebras (i.e. structures satisfying the axioms (B1)-(B10) and (C1)-(C7)) which are not isomorphic to any cylindric set algebra. Indeed, it is known that the class of those cylindric algebras which are isomorphic to some cylindric set algebra-the so-called representable cylindric algebras -cannot be finitely axiomatised. However, it can be recursively axiomatised; moreover, there exist various other (non-trivial) ways of picking it out. So we do have some means of characterising the representable cylindric algebras, and one could regard these means as providing the implicit definition of the algebraic operations that 26 The cylindric set algebras of the form C(M), for some model M of predicate logic, are exactly the ω-dimensional cylindric set algebras which are "regular" and "locally finite": see (Monk, 2000, §11) . 27 Strictly speaking, the representable cylindric algebras are those which are isomorphic to some subdirect product of cylindric set algebras. But one can show that any such algebra is directly representable as a cylindric set algebra (see (Németi, 1991, p. 503) ). 28 Monk (1969) ; see (Németi, 1991, Theorem 4) . 29 See Henkin et al. (1986) for a survey.
we sought. Alternatively, if one thought that the implicit definition ought to be appropriately "surveyable" in some sense (and denied that recursively axiomatisability was sufficient for surveyability), then one could take (C1)-(C7) to provide at least some grasp of the meanings of the algebraic operations with which we have spelled out our notion of structure-albeit not one that permits us to infer that the structural facts will always be representable by some distribution of objects equipped with properties and relations.
(A really radical structuralist might deny that this is even a problem: perhaps, they think, there are structural possibilities which correspond to no objectual possibility.) Again, the (cylindric) structural facts underdetermine the objectual facts, in the following sense: there are non-isomorphic models M and N such that C(M) ∼ = C(N ). In fact, we have the following analogue of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. For any models M and N of first-order predicate logic with identity, C(M) ∼ = C(N ) iff M is elementarily equivalent to a picture definitionally equivalent to N (that is, iff there are definitional expansions M + and N + such that M + is elementarily equivalent to N + ).
Proof. See (Monk, 2000, Theorem 3.3).
Note that the elementary equivalence here is with respect to a language containing identity, unlike the elementary equivalence referred to in Proposition 1. Hence, the cylindric structuralist does not face as much underdetermination as the Boolean structuralist: indeed, if M and N are finite, then C(M) ∼ = C(N ) iff M is definitionally equivalent to N (since for finite structures, elementary equivalence implies isomorphism).
Algebraic generalism
I'm not the first to defend the idea that ideas and resources from algebraic logic could be used to articulate and defend some form of structuralism. Dasgupta (2009) uses (a modified form of) Quine's predicate-functor logic to express a structuralist view, which he refers to as "generalism". For our purposes, the relevant observation is that Dasgupta spells out his "generalist language" G by using algebraic resources, as follows:
The generalist's ontology consists of a domain of properties, each with a given adicity. Properties of adicity greater than one might be better called relations, but I will use the term 'property' to cover them all. To talk about these properties the generalist introduces to language G terms of the form P n , where n indicates the adicity of the property denoted. [. . . ] According to the generalist, the domain of properties instantiates a certain algebraic structure. To talk about this structure, she introduces six expressions to G: &, ∼, c, p, ι, and σ. Syntactically, they apply to terms to give a complex term-much like 'the father of x' in English applies to terms to give a complex term-so we can call them 'term-functors'. [. . . ] In addition to these term-functors, the generalist also helps herself to a 2-place term I 2 which denotes what we ordinarily think of as the relation of identity.
These term-functors are drawn from Quine's "predicate-functor" logic. The idea is that they may be applied to terms for properties in order to form other, complex terms for properties. Using λ-calculus notation, and letting Φ n = λx 1 . . . x n .φ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) and Ψ m = λx 1 . . . x m .ψ(x 1 , . . . , x m ), the relationship between the expressions of G and those of ordinary first-order predicate logic are as follows:
• σΦ n = λx 1 . . . x n .φ(x n , x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n−1 )
G is then equipped with a single predicate for 0-place terms, obtains: asserting that Φ 0 obtains is what the generalist does in lieu of asserting that φ.
The resemblance to the cylindric-algebra apparatus is hopefully clear: clearly, the operations being used here are designed to do the same sort of thing as the cylindricalgebraic operations. Crucially, however, these operators are designed to algebraise the syntax of predicate logic, whereas cylindric algebras are an algebraic treatment of its semantics. Correspondingly, the only explanation Dasgupta gives of the language G is in terms of ordinary predicate logic, PL. In particular, he gives a semantics for G which is based on ordinary, predicate-logic models-essentially, the semantics obtained by "pulling back" the standard Tarskian semantics for predicate logic by the correspondence given above. (To be more accurate, he gives a semantics for a closely 30 (Dasgupta, 2009, pp. 52-53) related language Q, in terms of which he defines a consequence relation on G. I'll gloss over this, since I don't believe anything significant hangs on it.) This then leads to a concern that what we have here is not a new metaphysics, but just a curious notation for expressing the old, object-oriented metaphysics. Dasgupta's main result, that one can translate at will between G and PL, is hardly likely to reassure us in this regard: that just adds to the suspicion that G is no more generalist (structuralist) than PL.
Dasgupta does address this concern, however: he writes that 31 (Dasgupta, 2009, p. 66) But it does not seem to me that this strategy is legitimate. The mere adoption of a variable-free notation like G is surely not enough to renounce commitment to objectsnot if the only explanation that can be offered of the meaning of that notation is exactly the same as that offered to explain the meaning of its variable-laden cousin PL. Dasgupta's proposal seems to be that having used this semantics to induce a consequencerelation on G, we kick away the ladder by retaining the consequence-relation but forgetting the semantics from which it arose. On the one hand, it's then not clear what the purpose of introducing G is after all: why not perform the same manoeuvre with respect to PL, and save the time required to learn a new notation? On the other, it's not clear that this retains any meaning for the language G at all. Absent a semantics, what makes G a language equipped with a relation of implication at all, rather than (merely) a set of strings equipped with a certain partial order?
What is needed is a semantics for G which explains how the world could make sentences of G true, even if the world is (as the radical eliminative structuralist claims) not fundamentally constituted by individuals standing in properties and relations, and therefore not apt to be represented by a Tarski-style model. In other words: metaphysical proposals should address themselves to semantics not to syntax ("semantics" here in the technical sense of providing structures with respect to which formal languages can be truth-evaluated, not in the broader sense of inquiry into meaning). This focus on semantics has two advantages. First, it enables the ontic structuralist to be hermeneutic rather than revolutionary about the use of quantificational language: that is, they can allow that the use of such language is appropriate, since it can be interpreted in a structuralist manner (i.e., by cylindric algebras rather than by Tarski models). Thus, if the world has the form of a cylindric algebra rather than a Tarski model, then it would be just as capable of rendering our ordinary language true. Second, it helps avoid concerns that what we are doing here is merely representational, or at least to call tu quoque on such concerns. If the use of algebraic semantics defended here is only of representational significance, then the same must also apply to the use of Tarskian semantics: this would be a reason to think that there is no substantial metaphysical difference between the structuralist and her rivals, not a reason to declare victory for 32 Here's a possible answer: elsewhere, Dasgupta writes that "it is arguably analytic of the existential quantifier that existentially quantified facts are grounded in their instances." (Dasgupta, 2011, p. 131) The problem is that what makes this an analytic feature of the existential quantifier is surely the form of the semantics for it-as Dasgupta then goes on to say, "this understanding of the quantifier is arguably implicit in the standard Tarskian semantics for PL." (Dasgupta, 2011, pp. 131-132) . If so, then it will equally well be analytic of the operator c that facts of the form (cΦ 1 ) 0 obtains are grounded in instantiations of Φ 1 . 33 The hermeneutic/revolutionary distinction is borrowed from Burgess (1983) . the non-structuralists.
I agree with Dasgupta that the analogy with Galilean spacetime is instructive here, although I don't think its implications are what he suggests. It's one thing to abjure talk of absolute velocities, and to promise that one will only use sentences that speak in terms of velocity-differences: i.e. to promise that terms such as v 1 or v 2 will not be used to assert anything about the world, unless they have been made safe by embedding into terms such as (v 2 − v 1 ). Nevertheless, if the only account that one can give of the meaning of a term such as (v 2 − v 1 ) is one which defers to the meanings of v 1 and v 2 (as being absolute velocities in something like Newtonian spacetime), then one has not fully succeeded in articulating a metaphysics which is free of absolute velocities. Indeed, this is arguably the bind in which Newton's opponents found themselves: determined to renounce talk of absolute velocities, but unable to provide an appropriate structure for interpreting that talk (without also having to renounce talk of absolute accelerations).
The power of Galilean spacetime is precisely that it provides a structure in which a term like (v 2 − v 1 ) is interpreted directly, not via an interpretation of its component parts.
Cylindric algebras, analogously, provide such structures for G or (equivalently) PL.
Objections and replies
In this final section, I consider and reply to three objections to algebraic structuralism: that it is irrelevant to science, that it is incoherent, and that it is only an incomplete form of structuralism.
Irrelevance
The first objection is that this is all (mere) metaphysics, of no relevance to any actual science. Our best scientific theories are most certainly not phrased in terms of first-order predicate logic: so why should we worry about such esoterica as whether representable algebras can be finitely axiomatised, the gap between elementary equivalence and isomorphism, etc? My first response to this is to plead così fan tutte: confining attention to the case of first-order theories and models is, for better or worse, a standard feature of the literature on structuralism (and, indeed, the metaphysics of science more generally).
So insofar as my aim here is just to give a version of structuralism that is superior to its rivals on the market, the fact that I also engage in this practice is not dialectically relevant. However, I also think that a more substantial defence can be given. 34 My thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this concern.
For, there are good grounds for thinking that in actual, realistic theories, we can indeed find algebraic representations of the models of those theories which are sympathetic to the structuralist's aims. For instance, in spacetime theories there has been substantial interest in representing a manifold via its smooth algebra: the commutative, associative, unital algebra (over R) of smooth scalar fields on the manifold. Such an algebra encodes a great deal of information about the structure of the manifold; indeed, one can show that two manifolds have isomorphic smooth algebras iff they are diffeomorphic to one another. Moreover, geometric object fields on the manifold (e.g. vector fields, a metric, etc.) can be represented by certain structures on the smooth algebra (e.g. a vector field corresponds to a derivation on the smooth algebra). Thus, a model of a spacetime Similarly, in analysing quantum theories it often proves insightful to consider a collection of operators on a given Hilbert space as constituting a certain kind of algebra, known as a C * -algebra; in classical mechanics, the smooth scalar functions on phase space may usefully be characterised as a Poisson algebra; and so on and so forth. For our purposes, the relevant observation is that in such cases, we form an algebra whose elements represent qualitative properties (smooth scalar fields in the case of smooth algebras, physical observables in the case of C * -or Poisson algebras), and so abstract away from the individuals which would, in a more traditional presentation, be taken to be the bearers of those properties.
Thus, the algebraic approach to structuralism looks as though it will generalise to more realistic scientific contexts. Moreover, by studying the (relatively!) simple case of algebras for first-order models, we can get insight into what questions to ask, and what kinds of answers it is reasonable to expect. For example, the standard definition of a smooth algebra is (roughly speaking) that it is a commutative, associative, unital algebra (over R) which is isomorphic to the smooth algebra of scalar functions over some manifold; given the discussion of representability for cylindric algebras, we are motivated to ask whether any independent, complete characterisation of the class of smooth algebras is possible. (So far as I know, this remains an open question.) Similarly, the fact that isomorphism at the level of algebras does not necessarily lead to 35 Indeed, in modern differential geometry one standardly defines a vector field as a derivation on the smooth algebra (e.g. (Baez and Muniain, 1994, chap. 3) ). 36 For further discussion of Einstein algebras, see Rosenstock et al. (2015) .
isomorphisms at the level of objectual representations suggests that we should look for analogous "gaps" between the algebraic and non-algebraic representations in other theories: which, in the context of C * -algebras, is precisely the question of what to say about unitarily inequivalent Hilbert-space representations of the same C * -algebra.
These suggestions also give us some insight into how the argument from the history of science can be supported by algebraic structuralism. Recall that this argument claimed that the "structure" of a theory will be preserved across theory change, at least to a greater extent than other aspects of a theory. Since the characteristic feature of the algebras discussed above is that they comprise physical properties and relations, and it is those properties and relations which most immediately connect to empirical results, then-given the assumption that the empirical success of the old theory will be incorporated into its successor-we have some grounds for thinking that the algebraic structure of the two theories should exhibit the kind of continuity the argument demands. Of course, we don't expect that the algebraic structure will be fully preserved, i.e., that the algebraic representations offered by the successor theory will be precisely isomorphic to those offered by its predecessor: if that were so, then it's hard to see how the two theories could (for the structuralist, at least) really be regarded as distinct. But we can expect that the structure of the predecessor theory will be somehow embedded in that of the successor theory, i.e., that the algebras associated to the latter will, in some appropriate limit, reduce to or approximate towards the algebras associated to the former. And if we attend to the examples mentioned above, then we find that this picture is (somewhat) borne out: for example, in the use of deformation quantisation to analyse the relationship between algebras of classical and quantum observables.
Incoherence
Perhaps the most common objection to ontic structural realism is (as mentioned earlier) simply that it is an incoherent view, or at the very least that it is in need of more clarity.
Indeed, this concern is even raised by structuralists themselves: for example, French and Ladyman (2003, p. 41) comment How-it might be asked-can [structure] be regarded as primary and in some sense prior to [object] , when structures-understood as a system of relations-can only be defined in the first place in terms of objects-the relata? If the structural realist cannot answer this question, then the whole 37 See Ruetsche (2011) for more on this question. 38 See (Landsman, 2017, chap. 7) . metaphysical project threatens to come undone [. . . ] This question forms the kernel of an objection to the ontic form of SR which has been voiced to us by Redhead (in private discussion): If structure is understood in relational terms-as it typically is-then there needs to be relata and the latter, it seems, cannot be relational themselves. In other words, the question is, how can you have structure without (non-structural) objects?
Unsurprisingly, though, the most forthright versions of this objection have come from structuralism's critics. After giving several quotations from French and Ladyman (in- cluding that above), Sider (2017, p. 96) 
objects:
These quotations all suggest that reality is, in some sense, nothing but a qualitative structure, a network of relations with no objects standing in these relations. Now, the first and most flat-footed objection to this statement of the position is that relations without relata (or properties without instantiators) are incoherent. We are told to subtract the particular objects from the grid of relations, leaving only the pattern behind, like the Cheshire Cat's smile; but as Redhead is reported by French and Ladyman as objecting, this would seem to make no sense. [. . . ] This complaint may be perceived as arising from metaphysical conservatism, an unwillingness to "think outside the box" and reimagine metaphysical categories such as structure and relation, or perhaps as blind reliance on "intuition". But either reaction would be profoundly misguided. The complaint is just the insistence that some metaphysical account be clearly specified.
What are the basic notions? What are the proposed rules governing those notions? And how can those notions then be used in a foundational account of scientific theories? Standard predicate logic is the usual home for talk about relations, and gives clear answers to these questions. You can't just continue as if you accepted this framework-by speaking of relations-but subtract the entities and hope for the best. Individuals are too embedded within the standard framework; predicate logic provides no sentences about relations that don't also concern individuals. You need to properly specify a replacement framework, some replacement inventory of basic notions, rules governing those notions, and methods for using those notions in foundational contexts.
I do somewhat disagree with Sider's way of putting the complaint: as discussed already, it seems to me that the metaphysical commitment to individuals is not encoded in the syntax of predicate logic (the fact that its sentences talk about individuals) but rather in its semantics (the fact that Tarski-models of predicate logic represent relations as sets of tuples of objects). Modulo this issue, however, I think Sider is right to demand more clarity from structuralists about what an object-free ontology could look like. The main virtue of algebraic structuralism, for me, is that it offers a reply to this concern by providing a framework with the relevant features. In particular, algebraic structuralism gives us a clear picture of how to erase the cat but keep the grin: to pass from a Tarski-model to its cylindric algebra, we delete the individuals but keep the algebraic relationships between relations. It is in exactly those relationships that the pattern consists.
Incompleteness
This, however, leads naturally to the final objection: that algebraic structuralism does not succeed in truly expunging objects from the ontology. After all, a cylindric algebra consists of a bunch of things-the elements of the algebra-standing in certain algebraic relations to one another. So (the objection goes) rather than eliminating objects from the ontology, the algebraic structuralist has merely replaced them: they have shown how one kind of object ("ordinary" objects) can be eliminated in favour of another (elements of a cylindric algebra), but not how one might do without objects altogether. Lam and Wüthrich raise this concern in the context of Einstein algebras: 39 Although, as discussed above, the application to scientific theories requires more detailed work. 40 (Lam and Wüthrich, 2015, p. 624) 41 (Psillos, 2001, p. S22) Some terminology will be helpful. Sider (2017, §4.9 ) distinguishes between "radical" and "moderate" forms of anti-individualism: radical anti-individualism is the kind of account demanded by Lam and Wüthrich (2015) and Psillos (2001) of the ontic structuralist, with a wholesale rejection of any apparatus of quantification or predication; the moderate form, on the other hand, "accepts talk of 'entities', broadly construed-an entity is anything at all; for all x, x is an entity-but rejects the existence of certain sorts of entities, the "individuals" (and perhaps also certain concepts that are distinctive of individuals)."
Sider lists bundle theory, Dasgupta's algebraic generalism, and fact-ontologies as examples of moderate anti-individualism-and clearly, algebraic structuralism also falls into this category. As he remarks, explicit examples of radically anti-individualist theories are rather thin on the ground. So at issue is whether it is acceptable for algebraic structuralism to be just moderately anti-individualist, rather than radically so. Now, one concern about the above objection is whether the difference between radical
and moderate anti-individualism should be taken as metaphysically substantial. In the absence of extant theories that we can recognise as radically anti-individualist, it is hard to judge this question conclusively; but as with my discussion of algebraic generalism, I
am concerned that it may rest upon the conflation of representational with metaphysical criteria. For suppose that someone did indeed come to us with a "radically antiindividualist" theory: a theory which (somehow) avoids taking the form of assertions which ascribe certain characteristics to certain entities. That does not, by itself, seem to be enough to reassure us that the theory is not committed to objects. In particular, if it turns out to be possible to translate at will between this theory and standard, nonstructuralist metaphysics, then-just as was the case with algebraic generalism-that is a reason for thinking that we are dealing with an alternative language for expressing the same metaphysics, not a genuinely new metaphysics. Thus, there is a concern that radical and moderate anti-individualism are different styles or languages for presenting theories, not different metaphysical theories.
But let's bracket this issue: addressing it fully will get us rather too deeply into issues in the methodology of metaphysics. Even if we do grant that there is a robust metaphysical distinction between radical and moderate anti-individualism, it doesn't follow that any 42 Not to be confused with the distinction between radical and moderate ontic structuralism! After all, as I argue here, algebraic structuralism is a radical form of ontic structuralism, but a moderate form of anti-individualism. 43 (Sider, 2017, pp. 92-93) 44 Sider gives Turner (2016) as an example; Rayo (2017) also outlines such a project. 45 It remains an open question, to my mind, whether there is or could be such an apparatus: the best hope is likely something category-theoretic, but the details remain to be made out.
ontic structuralism worthy of the name must be committed to the former rather than the latter. We must ask: is it sufficient for ontic structuralism to renounce commitment A better way to determine whether a certain view has such-and-such a commitment is to see whether the arguments that were motivations for the view require that commitment or not. If they do, then it is reasonable to take the view to carry that commitment:
and anyone advocating the view (at least insofar as they use these motivations) whilst disavowing that commitment is engaging in illicit equivocation. If not, however, then there is no good reason to saddle proponents of the view with that commitment. In the introduction, I discussed two motivations for structuralism: the argument from the history of science, and the argument from redundancy. We have already discussed the argument from the history of science. Although that discussion was not conclusive, it does seem that algebraic structuralism is reasonably able to underwrite this argumentand it certainly does not seem that the prospects for that argument are improved by moving to a more radical anti-individualism. The barrier to more fully underwriting this argument is just the disconnect between first-order logic and actual scientific practice, not the fact that algebraic structuralism still traffics in entities of some kind.
That leaves the argument from redundancy. The argument here, recall, was that we need an account of what individuals are which will deliver anti-haecceitism. I
claim that algebraic structuralism does, indeed, succeed in doing that. Two objectual representations which are related by a permutation are, for the algebraic structuralist, merely two ways of representing the same structural facts (by Proposition 2, given that isomorphism entails elementary equivalence). We therefore have a characterisation of the invariant reality underlying such representations, which helps to explain why anti-haecceitism holds.
One concern with this reply, however, is that although algebraic structuralism avoids the permutation argument for individuals, it is subject to a higher-order version of the same problem: by permuting the relations in an algebra, one can obtain an algebra that differs only over which relations play which algebraic role. That appears to mean that we will face the same problems of redundancy and inaccessibility; and hence, one might question what has really been gained. I don't have space for a full response here, but let me make a couple of remarks.
First, the permissibility of such permutations will depend upon the extent to which one is a nomic essentialist: i.e., on whether one thinks that it is possible for a property or relation to play a different role in the laws to that which it actually plays. If nomic essentialism is true, and if nomological roles are unique, then no such permutation will deliver a possible world-so the arguments for redundancy and inaccessibility cannot get off the ground.
Second, even if one does not find nomic essentialism plausible with respect to ordinary properties and relations, it seems to me that it is highly compelling with respect to the higher-order properties and relations constituting the algebraic relationships (e.g. +, c i , etc.): given that (on the structuralist's account) the nature of these relations is constituted purely by their implicit definitions via the axioms (B1)-(B10) and (C1)-(C7), it is very hard to make sense of the idea of (say) the operation c i coming apart from the "c i -role" in the axioms. If this is granted, and given that permutations of (first-order) properties and relations are just present in the non-structuralist picture as the structuralist picture, then the algebraic structuralist is at least dealing with one fewer permutation problem than the non-structuralist: zero rather than one (if nomic essentialism about first-order properties is accepted) or one rather than two (if nomic essentialism about first-order properties is rejected).
Thus, algebraic structuralism is able to recover the motivations for structuralism despite being only a moderate form of anti-individualism. This suggests that radical anti-individualism should not be taken as a commitment of structuralism (at least, insofar as one's structuralism is motivated by the arguments from history of science and from redundancy).
Conclusion
So, to conclude: I've argued that the most charitable way to unpack the notion of "structure as the web of relations" is by characterising structure as an algebra of relationsspecifically, at least in the context of first-order theories, as a cylindric algebra. On a more methodological note, I also hope that the above is an incentive for philosophers to turn their attention to resources in the literature on mathematical logic. Much of our conventional apparatus for metaphysics derives from, or at least is reflected in, the logical resources pioneered by Frege and Russell. That makes it possible to discuss certain kinds of questions with a clarity and transparency that is surely a virtue; but it also risks meaning that we mistake contingent features of the logic we learn as undergraduates for deeply necessary features of the world. Many questions of interest to philosophers (when is it natural to regard two models as "having the same structure"?
What kinds of invariants could be used to characterise that structure?) are also of interest to mathematicians, and have received significant attention. As a result, there are well-researched mathematical candidates for the answers to such questions. Of course, these results cannot just be taken over uncritically: there is still a need for debate on whether these mathematical answers really do the job that we desire them for. But by ignoring this stock of existing results, we risk wasting our time on reinventing the wheel, or on defending positions known already to be non-starters.
